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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES





DISCHARGE. The debtor originally failed to timely file 
and pay taxes for several tax years. The debtor filed the returns, 
but did not pay the taxes, just before filing for bankruptcy. 
The returns improperly included the income of the debtor’s 
unmarried domestic partner and claimed the partner as a 
dependent. The IRS argued that the taxes were not 
dischargeable because the debtor either filed a fraudulent return 
or attempted to evade payment of the taxes. The court held 
that, although the inclusion of another taxpayer’s income was 
irrational and detrimental to the debtor (causing the debtor to 
pay more in taxes), the error was not fraud since the harm 
would be only to the debtor. The court also held that the mere 
failure to pay the taxes when due was insufficient evidence of 
an attempt to evade payment of the taxes; therefore, the IRS 
could not be granted summary judgment on the issue as a 
matter of law. In re Rouley, 305 B.R. 577 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
2003). 
NET OPERATING LOSSES. The debtor filed for Chapter 
11 and had net operating losses remaining from pre-bankruptcy 
tax years. The bankruptcy estate did not use these NOLs and 
incurred additional NOLs during the bankruptcy case. The 
debtor’s plan was confirmed and the debtor received a 
discharge. The debtor sought to use the NOLs from the re-
bankruptcy tax years as well as the NOLs remaining from the 
bankruptcy estate tax years. The court held that the NOLs were 
transferred to the debtor upon confirmation of the plan and 
the granting of the discharge and not when the plan was 
completed and the case dismissed. The court also held that 
the debtor regained the NOLs from the pre-bankruptcy years 
and received the NOLs incurred by the bankruptcy estate. 










ALTERNATE VALUATION DATE. The decedent’s 
estate hired an attorney to file federal estate tax returns for 
the estate. The estate tax return was filed three months after 
the dues date. The election to value the estate assets as of 
the alternate valuation date was not made on the federal estate 
tax return. More than one year after the original due date of 
the estate tax return, the estate filed a supplemental return 
which did make the election to use the alternate valuation 
date. The estate also sought an extension of time to file the 
alternate valuation date election. The IRS denied the request 
for an extension because the election was not made within 
one year of the due date for the original return. Ltr. Rul. 
200419005, Dec. 22, 2003. 
CONSERVATION EASEMENT. The decedent had 
created a trust funded with land which passed to the 
decedent’s children upon the decedent’s death. Before the 
estate tax return was filed, the trustee transferred a 
conservation easement on the land to a conservation fund 
established by the town in which the land was located. The 
conservation easement placed restrictions on the development 
of the land and granted enforcement powers to the 
conservation fund. The fund was  financed by the town which 
was committed to preserving land in the town for non­
development use. The IRS ruled that the estate was eligible 
for a charitable deduction for the transfer of the conservation 
easement, unless a charitable deduction was claimed by one 
of the trust beneficiaries on their income tax return. Ltr. Rul. 
200418005, Dec. 24, 2003. 
POWER OF APPOINTMENT. The decedent had 
received property in trust from a predeceased spouse’s estate. 
The predeceased spouse’s will stated that the marital trust 
was to qualify for the marital deduction and granted the 
decedent all the interest in the income form the trust but failed 
to specifically grant a power of appointment over the trust 
corpus. The predeceased spouse’s estate had claimed a marital 
deduction for the trust property which was allowed by the 
IRS. The decedent, believing that she had a testamentary 
power to appoint the trust property appointed the property 
to one heir. The decedent’s other heirs challenged the 
appointment, arguing in state court that the predeceased 
spouse’s will did not grant the decedent any power to appoint 
the trust property, causing the property to revert back to the 
predeceased spouse’s estate and pass to all heirs. The state 
courts held that no testamentary power of appointment was 
granted but noted in dicta that no other power to appoint the 
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property was granted either. The Tax Court agreed with the 
state courts that the predeceased spouse’s will failed to grant 
the decedent any power to appoint the trust property; 
therefore, the trust property was not included in the decedent’s 
estate. The IRS attempted to argue that the estate was estopped 
from claiming that the decedent did not have any power of 
appointment because the predeceased spouse’s estate had 
claimed a marital deduction, which implied that a power did 
exist. The court rejected the “duty of consistency” argument 
because the IRS was aware of all the facts throughout the 
process. Estate of Posner v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004­
112. 
VALUATION OF STOCK. The taxpayer owned a 
corporation which operated a bulk mailing company. The 
taxpayer gave nonvoting common shares to the taxpayer’s 
children and reported taxable gifts based on a valuation of 
the stock at 50 cents per share. The IRS assessed additional 
tax based on a valuation of 88 cents per share. The difference 
resulted from the projected income estimates used by the 
taxpayer’s and IRS appraisers. The court held that the IRS 
appraisal was based on more realistic projections of income 
and expenses; therefore, the appellate court upheld the Tax 
Court’s use of the IRS appraisal for valuing the stock. Polack 
v. Comm’r, 2004-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,484 (8th Cir. 
2004), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2002-145. 
FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 
ACCOUNTING METHOD. The IRS has issued a 
revenue procedure which allows taxpayers a limited deferral 
beyond the taxable year of receipt for certain advance 
payments. Qualifying taxpayers generally may defer to the 
next succeeding taxable year the inclusion in gross income 
for federal income tax purposes of advance payments to the 
extent the advance payments are not recognized in revenues 
(or, in certain cases, are not earned) in the taxable year of 
receipt. Except for certain short taxable years, the revenue 
procedure does not permit deferral to a taxable year later than 
the next succeeding taxable year. The revenue procedure 
neither restricts a taxpayer’s ability to use the methods 
provided in Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5 regarding advance 
payments for goods nor limits the period of deferral available 
under Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5. The revenue procedure also 
provides the exclusive administrative procedures under which 
a taxpayer within the scope of this revenue procedure may 
obtain consent to change to a method of accounting provided 
in the revenue procedure. Rev. Proc. 2004-34, I.R.B. 2004­
22. 
“AT RISK” LOSS LIMITATION. Under I.R.C. § 
465(b)(3), amounts borrowed for use in an activity will not 
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increase the borrower’s amount at risk in the activity if the 
lender has an interest other than that of a creditor in the activity 
or if the lender is related to a person (other than the borrower) 
who has a disqualifying interest in the activity. The rule applies 
even if the borrower is personally liable for the repayment of 
the loan or the loan is secured by property not used in the 
activity. I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D) provides that Section 465(b)(3) 
will apply to new activities only to the extent provided in 
regulations. The Tax Court in Alexander v. Commissioner, 95 
T.C. 467 (1990), held that, until regulations are issued, Section 
465(b)(3) could not be applied to a new activity. The IRS has 
adopted as final regulations which apply Section 465(b)(3) to 
the new activities described in Section 465(c)(3)(A). As 
originally enacted, I.R.C. § 465(b)(3) also applied to any 
borrowing from persons related to the taxpayer under I.R.C. § 
267(b). Section 432(c) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 
(Pub. L. No. 98-369) eliminated this rule but provided, instead, 
that a taxpayer’s amount at risk is not increased by amounts 
borrowed from a person related to a person (other than the 
taxpayer) who has a disqualifying interest in the activity. The 
regulations change Prop. Treas. Reg. §  1.465-20 to reflect the 
amendment made by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.  The 
regulations also modify the previous proposed regulations to 
reflect Section 465(b)(3)(B)(ii), which provides that, for 
purposes of determining a corporation’s amount at risk, an 
interest as a shareholder is not a disqualifying interest. Thus, 
amounts borrowed by a corporation from its shareholders may 
increase the corporation’s amount at risk.  Finally, the 
regulations also modify the previous proposed regulations to 
reflect Section 465(b)(6)(A), which provides that “qualified 
nonrecourse financing,” if borrowed for use in an activity of 
holding real property and secured by real property used in the 
activity, is not subject to the limitations of Section 465(b)(3). 
In addition, the regulations expand the exception to include 
financing that, if it were nonrecourse, would be financing 
described in Section 465(b)(6)(B). 69 Fed. Reg. 24078 (May 
3, 2004). 
BASIS. The taxpayers inherited an art gallery. The art 
collection was appraised for federal estate tax purposes and 
discounts were applied to the fair market value to account for 
various aspects of the collection, including marketability and 
wholesale discounts. The taxpayers operated the gallery for a 
few years using the discounted value of the art collection in 
determining the costs of goods sold each year. However, the 
taxpayers filed amended returns using undiscounted values for 
the collection, based on the original appraised fair market value. 
The court held that, under the “duty of consistency” doctrine, 
the taxpayers had to use the discounted value determined for 
estate tax purposes in valuing the collection for income tax 
purposes. Janis v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-117. 
CAPITAL GAINS. The IRS has issued a notice which 
provides guidance to regulated investment companies (“RICs”), 
real estate investment trusts (“REITs”), and their shareholders 
in applying I.R.C. § 1(h) to capital gain dividends of RICs and 
REITs. The notice explains how the changes to Section 1(h) 
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made by the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act 
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752, apply to RIC and 
REIT capital gain dividends paid (or accounted for as if paid) 
in taxable years that end on or after May 6, 2003. Notice 2004­
39, I.R.B. 2004-22. 
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The taxpayer 
had negotiated propane business contracts with other 
companies but the relationship broke down when the other 
companies attempted to acquire a portion of the businesses. 
The taxpayer and companies entered into a termination 
agreement under which the taxpayer was paid $2 million in 
settlement of claims for tortuous interference with contracts, 
injury to the taxpayer’s personal and professional reputation 
and emotional distress. The taxpayer excluded the settlement 
from income, arguing that the settlement was paid for personal 
injuries. The court held that the settlement was payment for 
the claim of tortious interference with contract and should be 
included in income. The court noted that the taxpayer had not 
mentioned any physical injuries in the negotiations and did 
not list any medical expenses. Lindsey v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Memo. 2004-113. 
The taxpayer had filed a civil employment claim against a 
former employer alleging employment sex discrimination, 
wrongful termination and intentional infliction of emotional 
stress. The claim did not mention any injury to the taxpayer’s 
hand resulting from an incident with a shoplifter. The taxpayer 
and former employer reached a settlement under which the 
taxpayer received a payment for alleged emotional distress. 
The taxpayer excluded the payment from income and did not 
claim any deduction for the portion of the payment which was 
paid to the taxpayer’s lawyer. The taxpayer argued that the 
settlement payment was received in compensation for the injury 
to the taxpayer’s hand but the court held that the settlement 
was made to settle the sexual harassment claim and not for the 
injury; therefore, the entire settlement was includible in gross 
income. The court held that the portion paid to the lawyer was 
included in income but was eligible for the miscellaneous 
deduction. Murray v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2004­
60. 
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The IRS has adopted 
as final regulations governing the application of the tax 
reduction rules. I.R.C. § 108(b)(4)(A), under the discharge of 
indebtedness rules where the taxpayer has acquired the assets 
of another corporation during the year of discharge of 
indebtedness. In particular, the regulations involve the problem 
that arises from application of Treas. Reg. §§ 1.381(c)(1)-1, 
1.381(c)(3)-1 which govern the carryover of tax items from 
the acquired corporation to the acquiring corporation and which 
require that the transfer ends the transferee corporation’s tax 
year.  The regulations clarify that, in the case of a transaction 
described in I.R.C. § 381(a) that ends a year in which the 
distributor or transferor corporation excludes discharge of 
indebtedness income from gross income under I.R.C. § 108(a), 
any tax attributes to which the acquiring corporation succeeds 
and the basis of property acquired by the acquiring corporation 
in the transaction are to reflect the reductions required by I.R.C. 
§§ 108, 1017. For this purpose, all attributes listed in I.R.C. § 
108(b)(2) of the distributor or transferor corporation 
immediately prior to the transaction described in I.R.C. § 381(a), 
including the basis of property, but after the determination of 
tax for the year of the discharge, are available for reduction 
under I.R.C. § 108(b)(2). The regulations also clarify that the 
tax attributes subject to reduction under I.R.C. § 108(b)(2) that 
are carryovers to the taxable year of the discharge, or that may 
be carried back to taxable years preceding the year of the 
discharge, are first taken into account by the taxpayer for the 
taxable year of the discharge or the preceding years, as the case 
may be, before such attributes are reduced pursuant to I.R.C. § 
108(b)(2). 69 Fed. Reg. 26038 (May 11, 2004). 
DISASTER LOSSES. On April 23, 2004, the President 
determined that certain areas in Illinois were eligible for 
assistance under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, as a result of severe storms and tornadoes 
that began on April 20, 2004.  FEMA-1513-DR. On April 24, 
2004, the President determined that certain areas in 
Massachucetts were eligible for assistance under the Act as a 
result of flooding that began on April 1, 2004.  FEMA-1512­
DR. Accordingly, taxpayers who sustained losses attributable 
to the disaster may deduct the losses on their 2003 federal 
income tax returns. 
FUEL CREDIT. The IRS has announced that the reference 
price that is to be used in determining the availability of the 
I.R.C. § 29 tax credit for the production of fuel from 
nonconventional sources for calendar year 2003 is $27.56. Since 
this amount does not exceed $23.50 multiplied by the inflation 
adjustment factor (2.1336), the I.R.C. § 29(b)(1) phaseout of 
the credit will not occur for any qualified fuel based on the 
above reference price. Notice 2004-33, I.R.B. 2004-18. 
HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS. The IRS has issued 
guidance on the eligibility of participants in a health flexible 
savings arrangement (FSA) or health reimbursement 
arrangement (HRA) for the income tax benefits of health savings 
account (HSA). Individuals will be eligible for HSA contribution 
income tax benefits if the individual is also covered by a limited-
purpose health FSA or HRA, a suspended HRA, a post-
deductible health FSA or HRA, or a retirement HRA. Rev. Rul. 
2004-45, I.R.B. 2004-22. 
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayer was employed part time as 
a retail sales clerk and also sold Mary Kay cosmetics as an 
independent contractor. Most of the taxpayer’s cosmetic clients 
were family and friends who lived some distance from the 
taxpayer. The taxpayer claimed mileage and travel expenses 
for trips to the family and friends, resulting in large travel 
expenses which were claimed as business expenses because 
the taxpayer sold cosmetics to the family member and friends 
on the trips. The taxpayer claimed business expenses in excess 
of business income fro three tax years and the IRS disallowed a 
deduction for the expenses in excess of the income. The court 
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held that the taxpayer did not pursue the cosmetics business with 
the intent to make a profit because of the consistent losses, 
personal pleasure derived from the trips to family and friends 
and the taxpayer’s failure to attempt to make the business 
profitable. Konchar v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2004-59. 
HOME OFFICE. The taxpayer operated a motivational 
speaker business and claimed a deduction for the costs associated 
with a home office. The taxpayer did not provide any written 
records to substantiate the use of a home office or the expenses 
attributable to the home office. The court held that the deductions 
were not allowed for failure of substantiation. The taxpayer was 
also denied deductions for other business expenses because the 
taxpayer failed to produce any written substantiation records to 
support the amount or purpose of the expenses. Woods v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-114. 
IRA. The taxpayer obtained a loan from a third party and 
although the loan was intended to be secured by life insurance 
policies, the loan was actually secured by the taxpayer’s interest 
in two retirement annuities. When the mistake was discovered 
the creditor agreed to not use the annuities as collateral; however, 
when the taxpayer defaulted on the loan, the creditor obtained 
payment from the annuities. The withdrawals from the annuities 
were subject to inclusion in the taxpayer’s income and were 
subject to an early withdrawal tax penalty. The taxpayer did not 
sue the creditor for the return of the withdrawn amounts. The 
court held that the mistaken use of the annuities to secure the 
loan did not relieve the taxpayer of liability for the early 
withdrawal penalties since the money was never returned to the 
annuities. Armstrong v. United States, 2004-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 50,238 (8th Cir. 2004), aff’g, 2003-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 50,473 (D. N.D. 2003). 
When the taxpayer was 53 years old, the taxpayer received a 
distribution from a retirement plan offered by a former employer. 
The funds were used to finish the remodeling of the taxpayer’s 
residence and for personal expenses. The taxpayer was not 
employed during the tax year and had health problems. The 
taxpayer included the distribution in gross income but did not 
pay the 10 percent additional tax on the distribution. The taxpayer 
argued that the 10 percent additional tax should not apply because 
the taxpayer suffered financial hardship from not working and 
from the health problems. The court rejected the taxpayer’s 
argument as not supported by the statute and held that the 
distribution was subject to the additional tax. The case does not 
mention the exception for early distributions used for medical 
costs. Milner v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-111. 
INTEREST. The IRS has ruled that an annual fee charged by 
a credit card issuing company for use of a credit card is not 
interest income and is included in gross income in the tax year 
the fee is posted to the credit card account, regardless of whether 
the fee could be refunded if the credit card user cancels the 
account. Rev. Rul. 2004-52, I.R.B. 2004-22. 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. A limited liability 
company had three individual members. Under state law, the 
LLC members were not liable for the debts of the LLC. The 
LLC incurred federal employment tax liability and the LLC 
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members have sufficient assets to pay the liability. The LLC 
was taxed as a partnership for federal tax purposes. The IRS 
ruled that, in general, the IRS may not levy against the assets of 
the LLC members for the LLC employment tax liability unless 
special circumstances, such as a fraudulent transfer of LLC assets 
to the members, made the members liable for the LLC debts. 
Rev. Rul. 2004-41, I.R.B. 2004-18. 
MEALS AND ENTERTAINMENT. The IRS has issued a 
revenue procedure providing guidance for use of statistical 
sampling to establish the amount of a taxpayer’s substantiated 
expenses for meals and entertainment which are excepted from 
the 50 percent deduction limitation. The revenue procedure 
applies to a taxpayer filing an original return, under examination, 
in litigation, or making a refund claim who desires to establish 
with respect to its income tax liability the amount of substantiated 
expenses paid or incurred for meals and entertainment excepted 
from the 50 percent deduction disallowance of I.R.C. § 274(n)(1) 
by reason of I.R.C. § 274(n)(2)(A), (B), (C), (D), or (E). Rev. 
Proc. 2004-29, I.R.B. 2004-20. 
PARTNERSHIPS. 
CONTRIBUTIONS. The taxpayer was a partnership with two 
partners. A third partner joined the partnership with more than 
de minimis contribution to capital. The partnership revalued an 
intangible asset. In the first ruling, the asset was amortizable. 
The IRS ruled that the partnership could make traditional, 
curative or remedial allocation of the amortization to take into 
account the built-in gain or loss from the revaluation of the asset. 
In the case where the asset was not amortizable, the IRS ruled 
that only deductible remedial allocations could be made to take 
into account the built-in gain or loss from the revaluation. Rev. 
Rul. 2004-49, I.R.B. 2004-21. 
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in April 2004 for 
purposes of determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. 
§ 412(c)(7), the corporate bond weighted average is 6.36 percent 
with the permissible range of 5.73 to 6.36 percent (90 to 120 
percent permissible range). The 30-year Treasury securities rate 
for this period is 5.17 percent, the 90 percent to 105 percent 
permissible range is 4.65 percent to 5.43 percent, and the 90 
percent to 110 percent permissible range is 4.65 percent to 5.69 
percent. Notice 2004-40, I.R.B. 2004-23. 
The taxpayer was employed as a postal carrier and borrowed 
money from the taxpayer’s retirement plan. Although the taxpayer 
paid off a portion of the loan, much of the loan remained unpaid 
for over a year. During that period, the taxpayer missed work for 
several weeks due to a back condition; however, the back 
condition was never diagnosed as a full disabled condition and 
the taxpayer was eventually able to return to work with lighter 
duties. The court held that the taxpayer was not entitled to the 
I.R.C. § 72(m)(7) exception for disability because the taxpayer’s 
disability was not of a long-continued or indefinite duration. 
Williams v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2004-57. 
S CORPORATIONS 
ELECTION. The IRS has issued procedures for late filing of 
shareholder consent to an S corporation election by spouses of 
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S corporation shareholders in community property states. 
Automatic relief is available if all of the following conditions 
are met: (1) the S corporation election is invalid solely because 
the Form 2553, Election by a Small Business Corporation, failed 
to include the signature of a community property spouse who 
was a shareholder solely pursuant to state community property 
law; and (2) both spouses have reported all items of income, 
gain, loss, deduction or credit consistent with the S corporation 
election on all affected federal income tax returns. Rev. Proc. 
2004-35, I.R.B. 2004-23. 
The taxpayer corporation was formed just prior to the effective 
date of the “check-the-box” regulations governing classification 
of entities for federal tax purposes. The corporation filed an S 
corporation election after the effective date of the “check-the­
box” regulations and the election was denied because of questions 
involving the corporation’s status under the “check-the-box” 
regulations. The IRS ruled that, because the corporation was 
properly classified as a corporation before the “check-the-box” 
regulations became effective, it was eligible for the S corporation 
election, which was effective for the tax year of the original 
election. Ltr. Rul. 200419023, Jan. 28, 2004. 
SHAREHOLDERS. The IRS has ruled that Indian tribal 
governments may not be S corporation shareholders because the 
tribal government is considered a state. Rev. Rul. 2004-50, I.R.B. 
2004-22. 
LABOR 
AGRICULTURAL LABOR. The plaintiff worked as a 
“packaging foreperson” for a company which raised chickens 
for their pelts. The plaintiff oversaw the packaging of “pelts” 
also known as “hackle” for shipment to customers and sought, 
under 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), overtime wages for working more 
than 40 hours per week. The company argued that the plaintiff 
was an agricultural worker not covered by the overtime rules of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),  29 U.S.C. §§ 201-209. 
The court held that the company was engaged in agricultural 
production and that the packaging of the pelts was an essential 
part of the entire agricultural operation; therefore, the plaintiff 
was an agricultural worker not covered by the overtime provisions 
of the FLSA. Pacheco v. Whiting Farms, Inc., No. 03-1170 
(10th Cir. 2004). 
STATE REGULATION OF 
AGRICULTURE 
CONFINED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS. The 
defendant Board of County Commissioner passed an ordinance 
which restricted the operation and expansion of confined animal 
feeding operations (CAFOs) in the county. The plaintiffs had 
obtained a state permit to expand their CAFO but the expansion 
was prevented by the county ordinance. The court held that the 
county ordinance was improper under the county home rule 
statutes, Kan Stat. § 19-101 et seq., because the ordinance 
prevented activity which was expressly allowed by state statute. 
Dawson v. Board of Commissioners of Norton County, KS, 
No. 89,822 (Kan. Sup. Ct. 2004). 
WILLS 
INTEREST RATE. The decedent left two wills and a will 
contest initiated by one of the heirs determined that the first 
will controlled the distribution of the decedent’s property, 
primarily a farm. Under the accepted will, the heir who received 
the farm was required to pay the other heirs the value of their 
share of the farm over 15 annual payments at the lowest interest 
rate allowed by the IRS to avoid a taxable gift from imputed 
interest. The heir argued that the interest payments began only 
after the will contest was decided and the interest rate was 
also determined on that date. The heir claimed that the interest 
could begin to accrue and be paid only once the value of the 
property was determined by the will contest. The court held 
that, because the property passed under state law as of the 
death of the decedent, the interest payments also began on 
that date and at the rate effective on that date. In re Estate of 
Holan, 2004 SD 61 (S.D. May 5, 2004). 
IN THE NEWS 
RESTRICTION ON CORPORATE OWNERSHIP OF 
FARM LAND. The U.S. Supreme Court has denied certiorari 
in South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. et. al. v. Hazeltine, 340 
F.3d 583 (8th Cir. 2003), aff’g, 202 F. Supp.2d 1020 (D. S.D. 
2002) (restrictions on corporate ownership of farms). See 
McEowen & Harl, “South Dakota Amendment E Ruled 
Unconstitutional – Is There A Future For Legislative 
Involvement In Shaping The Structure Of Agriculture?” 14 
Agric. L. Dig. 129 (2003). 
PATENTS. In this case the court invalidated the patent on 
an antidepressant chemical compound because the compound 
involved was in the public domain due to reproduction through 
clinical trials. Judge Gajarsa wrote a concurring opinion in 
which he said the technology was not patentable, not due to 
prior use, but because it could not satisfy the Section 101 
requirements. The judge noted that the paroxetine anhydrate 
involved in the case could naturally convert itself into 
hemihydrate. The judge compared this natural process to the 
spread of biotech seed traits. He gives an example of what he 
calls blue corn that is patented that the wind blows into 
neighboring cornfields. He states, “the implication that the 
patent owner would be entitled to collect royalties from every 
farmer whose cornfields contained even a few patented blue 
stalks - cannot possibly be correct.” The next issue of the 
Digest will publish an article by Roger A. McEowen on this 
case. Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., No. 03­
1285-1313 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 23, 2004). 
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